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Abstract
The importance of concise
communication in monetary
policy making cannot be over
emphasised. A good
communication of policy
definitely strengthens the
institutional independence of
central banks and enhances the
effectiveness of monetary policy.
However, no one single method
could fit all when it comes to
designing good communication
strategies because central banks
face different constraints as they
try to fine-tune their messages.
With current reforms and
financial liberalization, there is
added impetus for increased
communication between the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN),
market operators, stakeholders
and the public in general.
Monetary policy needs to be
explained and well understood
for the purpose of transparency
and accountability.

1.0 Introduction
Communication is an integral part and a
veritable tool for the implementation of
modern day monetary policy. In the last
few decades, central banking practice
and the act of monetary policy has been
evolving. In order to ensure openness in
the monetary policymaking exercise,
communication has become a veritable

tool in highlighting the core mandate of
central banks, especially in the areas of
ensuring low and stable inflation. In
terms of recent communication efforts,
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is
certainly in the right direction, although
there is still room for improvement. This
is because, the current reforms and
financial liberalization has added
impetus for increased communication
between the Bank and all its
stakeholders. In fact, effective
communication has become a vital tool
in the implementation of monetary policy
for two main reasons. First, experience
has shown that communication
improves the effectiveness of monetary
policy or, put another way, monetary
policy is most effective when it is
effectively communicated; and secondly,
communication helps central banks to
be more transparent and accountable.
Like all public policies, monetary policy
benefits from increased public
awareness and support. This translates
into what can best be known as
“legitimacy of policy.” Through proper
explanation of why some policies are
introduced and certain actions are taken,
central banks stand to gain more public
support for what they are doing. When
such confidence is established, greater
expectations and trust tend to
underscore good policymaking and
favourable outcomes. In order words,
with the clear recognition and
appreciation of central banks objectives,
agents in the economyconsumers,
investors, businesses, financial market
participants, and other stakeholders
begin to adjust their behaviour in line
with the expectation that future inflation
will be relatively under controlled.
Consequently, price, wage, and financial
decisions will tend to be consistent with
the targets. Thus, the net effect will be a
more stable macroeconomic
environment and greater success in
keeping inflation low and stable.
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Proper communication allows for a two
way flow of information. In that case, to
whom, should a central bank
communicate? Two audiences seem
critical. The central bank needs first of all
to communicate with the broad public
and its political stakeholders. This is
because the virtues of central bank
independence and price stability may
not be self evident to the body politic.
The central bank must constantly make
the case that its job matters and that it is
doing that job properly. To do so, it must
address the concerns of ordinary
citizens. This broad audience is best
reached through the mass media, e.g.
television and newspapers. What should
this audience hear? The central bank
needs to communicate its basic
objectives, strategies for achieving them
and its successes or challenges as well
as failures with very good reasons.
Consistency over time is crucial if public
understanding is to be developed. The
central banks' second audience is the
financial markets. This is because
monetary policy is transmitted through
the markets to the rest of the economy.
Thus the effectiveness of the policy will
be greatly enhanced by open and clear
communication between the central
bank and the markets. Given that most of
the treasury securities for the
transmission of monetary policy have
maturities that exceed the purview of the
central bank, good communication
should be able to identify the
implications for longer period. To that
end, the central bank needs to enlighten
the market operators to think and
process information as it does. This
implies sharing with the market the
broad objectives of the Bank's strategy,
and even the tactical details. This is
because the modern goal is to be so
predictable that monetary policy
decisions normally ratify market
expectations- expectations that the
central bank itself has managed
successfully. According to King (2000),
'transparency should lead to policy being
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predictable. Hence a successful central
bank should be boring. Therefore, the
old communications principle, “Repeat,
Repeat, Repeat,” has become more
appropriate because through its
communication, the Bank is providing the
opportunity for public critique of its
economic analysis, by economists,
financial market players, journalists and
reporters, politicians, and the public more
broadly. This is constructive since
engaging the public in issues are
important for broadening awareness and
understanding of monetary policy.
The main objective of this paper is to
examine current CBN's communication
practices and challenges as well as
highlight the need to be proactive in
planning a communication policy for the
Bank. The question is: Is the Bank doing
enough in terms of its communication
policy and contemporary central banking
practice?.
The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 discusses the literature
in central bank communication, while
Section 3 reviews monetary policy in
Nigeria as well as the CBN's
communication channels and challenges
faced. Section 4 highlights various
elements of communication in practice by
other central banks, and communication
challenges are in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 proffers policy options and
concludes the paper drawing largely from
lesson of experiences.
2. A Review of Literature
The empirical literature on central bank
communication is still in its infancy, but
has been growing rapidly recently.
However, there is a general consensus
that communication is a powerful tool to
further strengthen and move financial
markets. Blinder (1998) and Bernanke
(2004) emphasized the importance for
communication as a means for central
banks to influence asset prices in the
financial markets, provided that the
central bank has acquired a credible
reputation. In that respect,
communication is an important tool for
the effectiveness of monetary policy
implementation (Buiter 1999, Eijffinger

Oct./Dec. 2008

and Hoeberichts 2004, Issing 2005). It is
important that communication attempts
to influence the expectations of economic
agents, such that the desired reaction of
longer-term interest rates is achieved.
In principle, communication can in parts
even substitute policy action. Demiralp
and Jorda (2004) provide evidence that
by announcing changes in the intended
federal funds rate since 1994, it was
possible for the Federal Reserve to move
the federal funds rate with a smaller
volume of open market operations, which
indicates clearly that increased
transparency and more communication
can indeed be beneficial for the efficiency
of policy implementation. Moving one
step further, there might even be an effect
on financial markets if the central bank
communicates its views about the
intended level of asset prices and signals
its intention to make the necessary
adjustments in policy rates if asset prices
deviate from this target, a policy that has
frequently been labeled “open-mouth
operations” (Guthrie and Wright 2000,
Thornton 2004).
On the other hand, several authors have
argued that there might be a trade-off in
that more communication need not
always be optimal. King (2000) argues
that a central bank should be highly
transparent about its monetary policy
reaction function and its target. Beyond
that, however, a central bank should
refrain from “creating” news instead,
news should entirely arise from
information about the development of the
economy. The central bank also faces a
trade-off when giving a lot of information
induces not more but less clarity and
common understanding among market
participants, as there are limits to how
much information can be digested
effectively (Kahnemann 2003, Winkler
2000). The trade-off might become even
more pronounced if the central bank
communicates about issues on which it
receives noisy signals itself, such as the
revolution of the economy (as opposed
to, e.g., its intentions regarding upcoming
interest rate decisions). Amato, Morris
and Shin (2002) argue that such
communication can co-ordinate the
13

actions of financial market participants
away from fundamentals, in the sense
that they attach too much weight to the
central bank's views, not taking into
account that they reflect a noisy signal.
On the other hand, Svensson (2005)
suggests that such an outcome is rather
unlikely under plausible ranges for the
model's parameter values. In sum,
however, it is clear that transparency is
not an end in itself but merely a means to
help the authority achieve its mandate
(Issing 1999, Mishkin 2004). Guthrie and
Wright (2000) reported this to be true for
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Kohn
and Sack (2004) for the Federal Reserve,
and Reeves and Sawicki (2005) for the
Bank of England.
Beyond its importance in normal times,
communication has been highlighted as
a particularly effective tool under the zero
lower bound, i.e. when nominal interest
rates are close or equal to zero
(Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack 2004,
Woodford 2005). There is even evidence
that it is an indication about the future
path of policy that moves financial
markets (Ehrmann and Fratzscher
2005a, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson
2005).
Finally, some authors have analyzed the
content of central bank communication.
Gerlach (2004) develops a quantitative
indicator from the assessment of
inflation, economic activity and M3
growth in the editorial of the ECB's
Monthly Bulletins, and finds that this
indicator can explain interest-rate setting
of the ECB. In a similar fashion, Rosa and
Verga (2005) and Heinemann and Ullrich
(2005) analyze the content of the ECB's
introductory statements to the press
conference following Governing Council
meetings. They constructed indicators for
the monetary policy stance of the ECB
based on the words used in the
statements, and showed that the
indicators can explain interest-rate
setting, although they serve as
substitutes, not as complements to
macroeconomic variables in Taylor-type
rules.
3.0

Monetary policy at the
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Central Bank of Nigeria
The Central Bank of Nigeria has adopted
various monetary policy regimes since its
inception in 1959. The different monetary
policy regimes that were adopted
include: the Exchange rate targeting
regime; (1959
1973), Monetary
Targeting Regime 1974 to present; Direct
Monetary Control 1974 - 1992 and
Indirect Monetary Control 1993 to
present. These policy regimes have
been on short term basis (annual)
between 1959 and 2001. However, in
2002, the medium term perspective
monetary policy framework was
introduced mainly to address the lag in
which monetary policy affect the ultimate
objective in the short-term. This
framework is aimed at freeing monetary
policy from the problem of time
inconsistency and minimizing overreaction due to temporary shocks. This
new monetary policy framework, which is
still in operation, is based on the
evidence that monetary policy actions
affect the ultimate objectives with a
substantial lag.
Under the framework, monetary policy
guidelines are open to half-yearly review
in the light of developments in monetary
and financial market conditions in order
to achieve medium to long term goals.
The main objectives of monetary policy
since then have been to achieve a low
and stable inflation as well as maintain a
stable exchange rate of the naira. There
is also the need for a more competitive
financial sector geared towards
improving the payments system. The
open market operations (OMO) has
continued to be the primary tool of
monetary policy, and is complemented
by reserve requirements, discount
window operations, foreign exchange
market intervention and movement of
public sector deposits in and out of
DMBs.
In order to achieve its objective the CBN,
has the responsibility of formulating and
implementing monetary policy, as well as
of deciding on matters pertaining to the
conduct of monetary policy, to the
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The
MPC comprises the Governor
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(Chairman), the 4 deputy Governors, six
departmental Directors, two external
board members, one member appointed
by the Ministry of Finance and the
Secretary. The Committee, which used
to convene every quarter, now convenes
on a bi-monthly basis with effect from
January 2007. The secretariat for the
MPC at the CBN has also gone through a
number of modifications over time. From
being an ancillary function of the
Research and Statistics Department to
the recent creation of a full fledged
department in 2005.
3.1 CBN Communication Channels
In its effort to clarify all aspects of its
monetary policy, the CBN has overtime,
established various communication
channels with the public and market
participants. Immediately after the MPC
meeting the Governor holds a press
conference in which he gives an
introductory speech on the decision
reached and the rationale behind it. This
press conference includes a question
and answer session, which is attended
by various media representatives, and
provides the platform for a timely
explanation of the decisions. At the press
briefing, the media also has the
opportunity to ask questions about
broader economic issues that are of
importance to the public. Following the
press conference a policy decision
announcement is then posted on the
CBN intranet. As soon as this is done,
transcripts of the press conference
become available on the website.
The detailed minutes of the MPC are not
published. Although some central banks,
such as the Bank of England, release
their minutes to the public, the CBN
follows the practice of the ECB by not
making the minutes available for public
consumption. In recent times, the MPC
report provides a comprehensive
analysis of the domestic and
international economy. In particular, the
report consists of the following five major
sections: (a) international developments
and exchange rates, (b) monetary
developments, (c) inflation, (d) the
domestic economy and (e) external
transactions.
14

As part of its communication channel, the
CBN is also statutorily obliged to publish
an annual report on its activities during
the previous year. Moreover, the law
requires that the Governor should submit
as the need arises, a report on past and
current year developments both to the
President and the National Assembly.
The Governor may also be asked by
different house committees to testify on
subjects pertinent to monetary policy and
the economy as a whole. Annually, the
CBN organizes an annual conference of
financial correspondents and the
Governor meets with them during which
the Bank's practices and views about a
wide range of economic issues are
examined and explained.
The Governor and the Bank's senior staff
also constitute an important vehicle for
explaining the views of the CBN to the
public. They are often invited to give
speeches or take part in panel
discussions which are usually open to
the public on subjects that include
monetary and exchange rate policy, etc.
The CBN also gives presentations to
groups of students and experts who are
always welcome to visit the Bank.
The Bank brings out a number of ad-hoc
publications, which contain a wealth of
useful information on national and
international issues. Information on
various facets of Nigerian economy is
disseminated through the CBN
publications, such as, Monthly Economic
Report, Public Education Series,
Handbook of Research Methodology,
Statistical Bulletin, CBN Bullion, CBN
Briefs, Economic and Financial Review
and Occasional paper series. These
publications contain valuable information
useful to researchers and to the general
public at large. The CBN also brings out
special publications and monographs
from time to time dealing with issues
such as the problems of agricultural
finance, micro finance etc which have a
unique place in the economic information
system in the country. There is also a
document known as the Monetary and
Credit Guideline, which used to be
issued every year and is an important
source of background information,
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especially for practitioners in the banking
sector and the judiciary as well as the
academia.
4. Communication in practice by
some other central banks
It is now a known fact that central banks
are now generally more open about most
aspects of monetary policy. A remarkable
change towards greater transparency
has occurred in the past decade
regarding central banks' objectives,
policy instruments, decision-making
procedures and policy decisions. The
developments of inflation targeting
frameworks in particular have improved
the standards of communication
strategies. Inflation targeting involves
more than just the announcement of a
numerical inflation objective.Asignificant
feature of the regime is the
communication structures put in place.
This has opened a multitude of issues for
policy makers to consider with regards to
their overall communication strategies.
Objectives and instrument targets have
been announced; interest rate decisions
are explained in a range of fora; and
there is greater recognition of the
interaction between the tactics of
monetary policy and communication
policies.
Before the advent of formal inflation
targeting regimes, the ultimate goals of
monetary policy were rarely specified
explicitly. While secondary stabilization
goals are normally not formulated
precisely, the primary goal of low and
stable inflation is now clearly enshrined
in numerical point targets and ranges.
The United States and Japan are two
notable exceptions. Even the ECB felt
compelled to provide the public with a
numerical definition of its price stability
objective. A publicly announced
numerical target for inflation, if credible
and feasible, can be an extremely
powerful anchor for coordinating
expectations. However, the confusion
generated by the ECB's two-pillar
monetary framework serves as a partial
warning of the dangers in releasing
numerical guidelines for policy. In some
countries, such as the United Kingdom,
a n o ff i c i a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e
circumstances surrounding a breach of
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the inflation target must be provided
either to the government or the public.
Even in those countries not obliged to do
so, the central bank is often eager to
explain the reasons for target misses in
order to help preserve its credibility.
However, such explanations themselves
become an important part of public
knowledge.
In most countries reviewed except the
United States and Australia, policy
decisions are explained in press
conferences and speeches. In fact,
minutes are published by most of them,
though with some delay after the end of
the MPC meetings.
More generally, the views of the central
bank are elaborated upon in monthly or
quarterly periodicals, such as the Bank of
England's Inflation Report or the ECB's
Monthly Bulletin. Technical descriptions
of its knowledge of the economy are
sometimes dispensed in working papers.
Central banks perhaps reach the widest
audience through the popular press.
Developing relationships with members
of the press may be crucial in ensuring
that an undistorted picture of the central
bank's views is given a proper airing. But
care must be taken by the central bank in
explaining its past actions relative to past
events in order to avoid introducing
greater noise into the pool of current
public knowledge. The problems
involved are in order of magnitude,
especially when the views of a committee
of independent members are to be
explained. The revelation of
disagreements among committee
members may confuse the markets,
causing more harm than good; this view
is shared by ECB and CBN who do not
reveal precise voting results.
A more sensitive issue concerns the
release of numerical forecasts of
macroeconomic variables or indications
of the future stance of monetary policy.
Forecasts typically assume constant
policy rates over the forecast horizon.
But this assumption is unrealistic in most
situations: both policy makers and
economic agents alike often have good
reason to expect that policy rates will be
15

changed during the period of concern.
This makes the interpretation of such
forecasts more difficult than may appear
at first. Alternatively, the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand has published projections
with an endogenous path for policy.
While this approach is arguably more
consistent internally, it ensues from the
possibility that agents do not fully
appreciate that projections are made
conditional on the data at hand. In the
end, more confusion may arise when
policy rates inevitably depart from a path
projected previously, not to mention the
potential for damage to the central bank's
credibility. All the same, central banks do
provide indications of their views of future
economic conditions and the future
stance of policy. For instance, one device
used by the Federal Reserve is to
announce a “bias” along with a decision
on the target for the federal funds rate.
The bias provides a qualitative indication
of the perceived risks to the economic
outlook, and hence the more likely future
course of monetary policy actions.
A brief summary of current
communication practices is given in
Table 1. At the cost of some
generalization, practices can be broadly
divided into means to improve the
effectiveness of monetary policy and
means to enhance central bank
accountability. The former category can
be further broken down between
communication on policy decisions and
on the central bank's assessment of
economic conditions. As is evident from
the table, there is considerable uniformity
across central banks on certain elements
of strategies aimed at making monetary
policy decisions more transparent; For
example, the adoption of explicit shortterm targets for instruments and the
public announcement of policy decisions
(eg press releases). In addition, most
central banks now regularly publish
detailed descriptions of their views on the
current and prospective state of the
economy. However, there is less
agreement on the detail and timing of
explanations of policy decisions. For
instance, not all central banks publish the
minutes of policy meetings, and the lags
in publication vary for those that do.
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Table 1: Summary of Current Communication Practices

5. Communication Challenges
There are practical constraints on central
bank communication strategies. These
involves a situation where central banks
might want in principle to release more
information, there might be good for not
to do so.
The first challenge is the fact that apart
from the obvious inappropriate release of
proprietary information, which could
have a chilling effect on the future flow of
such information to policymakers,
improving communication is not
costless. Clear communication requires
time, money and central bank resources.
Subjected to a serious cost-benefit
analysis, releasing certain types of
information might simply prove to be
wasteful.
In addition, deliberations in policy
meetings benefit greatly from full and
frank discussions, which could be
adversely affected by too much

openness, such as broadcasting
meetings or releasing complete
transcripts as soon as would be possible.
Similarly, enhanced transparency
regarding policy deliberations, voting
records and so on might induce the
media to dramatise differences in opinion
amongst policymakers, which in turn
could politicise internal monetary policy
discussions. All these concerns suggest
that central banks must carefully
consider what information they provide.
Another important issue is how the
central bank can best get its intended
message across clearly to the public that
is mostly economic illiterate. There are
several reasons why this is so
challenging. First, language may be
imprecise and subject to various
interpretations, especially when
policymakers feel the need to be concise.
Consider, for example, the recent
changes in the FOMC's post-meeting
press release. Starting in mid-1999, the
Committee indicated a “bias”, along with
16

its policy rate target, which
provided a signal of what
deviations from target might
be likely during the intermeeting period. Its full
meaning, however, was not
well understood in financial
markets. Consequently, in
February 2000, the
statement on bias was
replaced by the “balance of
risks” statement. This was
meant to indicate the
FOMC's view of likely
outcomes for inflation and
output over a horizon
beyond the subsequent
policy meeting. Moreover,
wishing to keep its
statement brief, the
Committee has had to
choose its words carefully in
order to best express its
views. Their experiences
have shown that even slight
modifications in the balance
of risks statement can
cause a large, and
sometimes unwanted,
reaction in the markets. A
longer statement, with
greater emphasis on the conditions
under which certain policy actions would
be taken, might seem the obvious
alternative but would necessarily delay
its release to the public at the conclusion
of an FOMC meeting. Moreover, it might
unduly raise the sensitivity of markets to
unfolding economic developments.
Secondly, while striving to be clear and
predictable during normal
circumstances, central banks might not
find it feasible, or desirable, to describe
all possible contingencies and what they
might do in response. This is partly
because of the impossibility of knowing
the precise nature of events until they
occur and partly due to concerns that the
discussion of extreme contingencies
might unduly influence the public and
ruin financial markets. In addition, the
difficulties may reflect the reality that the
public may be unwilling or unable to fully
digest complex analyses and a
substantial amount of policy information.
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Finally, because a focal point of
communication strategies is credibility,
an ironic question arises: can central
banks appear to be too credible? A
central bank may face a “winner's curse”
problem: if it is too credible, the public
may place more weight on its
pronouncements than the central bank
intended. This problem might be
particularly relevant when policymakers
make comments on low-probability
outcomes, which the public then blows
out of proportion. In such an
environment, providing too much
information may end up adversely
affecting the central bank's credibility.
Similarly, if the markets simply accept the
central bank's assessment of how policy
should evolve in the future, the two-way
communication referred to above could
become seriously compromised.
The pay-offs to better communication are
potentially significant but, if history is a
reliable guide, attaining such gains will
most likely involve careful and prudent
efforts rather than quick fixes.
6.
Policy Options and
Conclusion
6.1
Policy Options
History has shown that central banks
strive for continuous improvement in
their communication strategies. They
also learn from the efforts of their peers,
as has been evident in the trend towards
the use of inflation targeting frameworks
by many central banks around the world.
The CBN is still fine-tuning policies and
steps towards transiting to inflation
targeting as its monetary policy
framework. Therefore, discovering new
communication modalities, as well as
refining existing strategies, remains
integral to future progress.
Consequently, there are some options
the CBN would have to pursue now and
in the period ahead.
v
The level of economic illiteracy
in the Nigeria at large is a particular
problem for the CBN as in other
developing countries. Thus, the Bank
would have to embark on massive
campaigns and sensitization
programmes geared towards educating
the Nigerian public generally about
economic policies but especially on
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monetary policy issues. The
language/dialects of the various ethnic
groups should be the medium of
communication. The target audience is
Nigerians in the market places, schools
at all level, and National Youth corp
camps, National and State House of
Assemblies and Nigerians in Diaspora
etc.
The Bank should actively
promote economic education
through a variety of publications
and activities for schools in
Nigeria. These could include an
annual Monetary Policy
Challenge for secondary school
economics students, in which
teams compete to produce
simulated monetary policy
advice.
Internal communication is
equally as i mportant with
external communications, and
various challenges arise in this
connection. To this end, the
newly established Monetary
policy Department should carry
out regular sensitization
exercise to all the CBN
branches. External
communication is widely
delegated among staff, which
therefore needs to be well
informed on what they
communicate. But at the same
time, there is need for clarity
about who the central bank's
spokesperson is, who is
responsible for which
information releases especially
on sensitive issues, and on
when staff are speaking for
themselves and not the
institution, for example on their
research work.
It is also necessary to have an
economic calendar for the
effective conduct of monetary
policy which is the primary role
of the CBN. Unlike fiscal policy
and other economic policy
formulation processes,
monetary policy requires up-todate and detailed information
for effective formulation.
Therefore, it would be

4

4

4
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expedient for the CBN to lead a
process whereby information
for decision making is regular
and as much as possible
available.
Economic calendars present a
detailed schedule for obtaining
these indicators, thereby giving
economic managers room to
plan as data is made available
when due.
Finally, credibility is an attribute
needed by the CBN, and
establishing it is a challenge
when there is a recent history of
inflation being on the increase
and no central bank can
establish or maintain credibility
through communications alone.
It is what you do, much more
than what you say, that is
important in this regard.
Therefore, the Bank should
intensify its developmental
efforts like the Agricultural
Credit Guarantee Scheme,
Micro Finance Scheme, and the
SMIESS, which are all poverty
eradication efforts.

6.2
Conclusion
In conclusion, our concern is that one
way the CBN can help stabilize the
economy for growth is by reducing the
expectations of uncertainty about its
monetary polices framework and
actions. It was not uncommon in the past
for CBN to see a strategic advantage in
withholding some information about
decision, intentions and actions. This
was largely predicated on the view that
monetary policy actions could be more
effective if they were not anticipated by
the public. In recent times, this view is
clearly becoming obsolete given the
amount of reforms and liberalization. It
has become imperative that CBN should
ensure wider dissemination of
information, clarity and buy-in by all
economic agents. Furthermore, timely
and relevant information is vital for
efficient policy making and stabilizing
expectations in an emerging economy
like ours.
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